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In twenty states throughout the country, the government may petition for 
the civil commitment of detained sex offenders after they are released from 
prison.  Although processes differ among the states, the government must 
generally show at a court proceeding that a detained sex offender both 
suffers from a mental abnormality and is dangerous and that this 
combination makes a detained sex offender likely to reoffend.  At such court 
proceedings, both the government and the respondent will present evidence 
to either the court or the jury on these issues.  As in most court proceedings, 
hearsay evidence is inadmissible at sex offender civil commitment hearings 
unless it meets sufficient indicia of reliability or fits within an established 
exception to the general rule against hearsay. 
On November 19, 2013, the New York State Court of Appeals determined 
that in sex offender civil commitment hearings, the best way to show that 
hearsay evidence regarding uncharged crimes and/or dropped charges 
meets sufficient indicia of reliability is to require live confrontation of the 
declarant.  This Note argues, however, that neither the U.S. Constitution 
nor New York State’s Civil Practice Law and Rules require live 
confrontation.  In addition, live confrontation conflicts with the legislative 
intent of New York State’s sex offender civil commitment statute and is 
detrimental to the psychological well-being of victims of sexual assault. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The year is 1998:  a man named Floyd is sexually abusing Jane Smith’s1 
eight-year-old daughter Mary and fifteen-year-old daughter Sarah.2  Either 
because of denial or a lack of knowledge, Jane is unaware that Floyd has an 
extensive criminal history of sexual abuse.  Only six years before, Floyd 
was convicted of sexual abuse for raping a twenty-three-year-old female 
neighbor.3  Two years later, Floyd was accused of sexually abusing a 
fifteen-year-old girl.  One year after that, Floyd pled guilty to harassing the 
girl’s twin sister after inappropriately touching her while she was staying at 
Floyd’s home.  Floyd’s rap sheet does not stop there.4  Only two years later, 
Floyd was accused of sexually abusing an eight-year-old family friend and 
admitted to having inappropriate telephone conversations with his 
seventeen-year-old sister-in-law.5 
One day in 1998, the abuse came to a screeching halt when Jane walked 
in on Floyd lying on top of Sarah, attempting to play a “tickle game” with 
her.6  Although there was enough evidence to bring charges against 
Floyd—and charges were in fact brought—they were eventually dropped.7  
To spare Sarah the trauma of testifying at trial, Jane agreed that if Floyd 
signed a parole document agreeing to stay away from Sarah, she would 
drop the charges.  Jane immediately broke up with Floyd, and soon 
thereafter, Mary accused Floyd of sexual abuse.  The district attorney, 
however, determined that there was insufficient evidence and corroboration 
for these accusations, and no charges were brought against Floyd.8 
Fast forward to the year 2007:  Floyd has since been convicted of 
sexually abusing his nine-year-old stepson and eight-year-old stepdaughter 
from another relationship and served four years in prison.9  Then, the 
telephone rings:  it is the Attorney General’s Office.10  One of the assistant 
attorney generals asks to speak with Mary, who is now seventeen years 
old.11  The assistant attorney general reluctantly explains that Floyd had 
finally been convicted of sexual abuse of yet two more youths and is 
 
 1. All names in this Introduction are fictitious as to maintain anonymity and are only 
used for clarity. 
 2. See State v. Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d 204, 207 (N.Y. 2013). 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See State v. Floyd Y., 953 N.Y.S.2d 566, 570 (App. Div. 2012), rev’d, 2 N.E.3d 204. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d at 205–07. 
 10. The Attorney General’s Office represents the state in cases pertaining to sex 
offenders requiring civil commitment or supervision. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03 
(McKinney 2011).  Unlike in criminal proceedings, where the District Attorney represents 
the “people,” the Attorney General represents the “state” in these cases. Id. 
 11. The assistant attorney general does not need to speak with Sarah because the 
agreement Floyd Y. signed to stay away from her was sufficient substantiating evidence. See 
infra notes 302–03 and accompanying text. 
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nearing his release date from prison.  The only way to ensure he is not 
released is for the state to file a petition for civil commitment, and the only 
way the state will have enough evidence to show that Floyd requires civil 
commitment is for Mary to testify in open court—in front of her abuser—
about what happened to her as a child nine years earlier. 
The assistant attorney general does not make this call lightly.  In most 
cases, a sex offender’s prior victims play no role in sex offender civil 
commitment proceedings.12  Because the district attorney did not have 
enough evidence to corroborate Mary’s accusations in 1998, however, the 
assistant attorney general needs the victim to come in and testify.  If she 
does not, then the state cannot introduce her accusations against Floyd at 
the civil commitment proceedings, and it will be as if the abuse never 
happened. 
The scenario presented is drawn from the New York State Court of 
Appeals case, State v. Floyd Y.,13 in which the court held that, without 
substantiating evidence, the introduction of statements about uncharged 
crimes and dropped charges would violate due process.14  Consequently, 
the court held that the most credible way to ensure due process is to 
establish the statements’ reliability by requiring the declarant to testify in 
open court about the events that occurred.15 
The civil commitment of a U.S. citizen is extremely serious.  It deprives 
citizens of one of their most basic rights:  liberty.16  Further, because most 
sex offender civil commitment statutes do not prescribe a term of years for 
civil commitment, sex offenders found to require civil commitment may be 
deprived of their liberty indefinitely.17 
Further, some commentators argue that civil commitment statutes violate 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution, which states, “nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offen[s]e to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb.”18  Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the civil 
commitment of sex offenders does not violate the Fifth Amendment in any 
respect,19 the debate about the constitutionality of civil commitment statutes 
survives today.20 
Although the civil commitment of a U.S. citizen is of great consequence, 
the psychological well-being of victims of sexual assault is also gravely 
important.  Sex offender civil commitment laws are not intended to apply to 
 
 12. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 13. 2 N.E.3d 204 (N.Y. 2013). 
 14. See id. at 205. 
 15. Id. at 214. 
 16. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 17. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.09 (McKinney 2011) (explaining that sex 
offenders civilly committed under Article § 10 have the right to annual examinations for 
discharge; however, if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent 
is still a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement, confinement will continue until the 
respondent’s next examination). 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 19. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997). 
 20. See Kevin G. Vanginderen, Kansas v. Hendricks:  Throwing Away the Key, 20 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 357, 371–75 (1998). 
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all sex offenders, but rather to only the most violent, dangerous, and 
recidivist ones.21  While this ensures that only the “worst of the worst” will 
be considered for civil commitment, it may have severe implications for the 
well-being of victims. 
For example, numerous psychological studies conclude that victims of 
sexual assault who testify in court may suffer irreparable harm such as 
stunted development, depression, anxiety, and uncontrollable fear.22  This is 
because testifying in front of one’s abuser may reexpose a victim to feelings 
of betrayal, helplessness, and powerlessness.23  Furthermore, both state 
legislatures and courts have recognized the same sentiment.24  Around the 
country, both state and federal courts implement alternatives that either 
reduce or eliminate the need for live confrontation, while still ensuring the 
accused due process.25 
Nonetheless, the New York State Court of Appeals suggests that in sex 
offender civil commitment hearings, which often take place decades after 
victims have been sexually abused, the most reliable way to ensure due 
process is to require live confrontation.26  While on the surface this solution 
may seem reasonable, this Note argues that there are various alternatives 
that satisfy due process without unnecessarily involving the live testimony 
of past victims of sexual assault. 
Part I of this Note explores the history of civil commitment in the United 
States, the laws that govern civil commitment statutes, and New York 
State’s Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act.  Part II presents the 
events leading up to the holding in State v. Floyd Y. as well as how the 
decision relates to the laws governing civil commitment statutes.  Part III 
examines the psychological impacts live confrontation may have on victims 
of sexual assault, and Part IV concludes that live confrontation can be, and 
should be, the last resort to substantiate hearsay evidence in sex offender 
civil commitment proceedings. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES, THE GOVERNING RULES, AND NEW YORK STATE’S SEX 
OFFENDER MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT ACT 
Part I first explores the history of civil commitment law in the United 
States.  This part then presents the laws governing civil commitment 
statutes and concludes with an examination of New York State’s Sex 
Offender Management and Treatment Act. 
 
 21. See S. 3318, 230th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 59–63 (N.Y. 2007) (stating that “those 
referred for civil commitment should be repeat, chronic felony sex offenders who have 
committed predatory crimes involving violence, stranger victims or young children”). 
 22. See infra Part III.B. 
 23. See infra Part III.B. 
 24. See infra Part II.B. 
 25. See infra Part II.B. 
 26. See State v. Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d 204, 214 (N.Y. 2013). 
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A.  The History of Civil Commitment Law in the United States 
Part I.A first explores how the civil commitment of the mentally ill came 
to fruition in the United States.  It then explores the history of civil 
commitment, focusing on the civil commitment of sex offenders in the 
United States in general and New York State specifically. 
1.  The Origins of Civil Commitment Law 
In order to understand how and why states began to civilly commit 
dangerous sex offenders suffering from mental abnormalities, it is useful to 
acknowledge the justifications and origins of civil commitment of the 
mentally ill generally. 
There are two main justifications state governments cite in implementing 
their power to civilly commit the mentally ill.27  First, state governments 
cite the doctrine of parens patriae.28  Parens patriae is a Latin phrase that 
translates to “parent of the country.”29  The idea behind parens patriae is 
that the government has the responsibility to act in the best interest of its 
citizens when such citizens cannot do so for themselves.30  The second, and 
perhaps stronger, justification for civil commitment is rooted in the states’ 
police powers.  The states’ police powers are derived from the Tenth 
Amendment, which states that all powers not delegated to the federal 
government are reserved to the states.31  It follows from the Tenth 
Amendment that states therefore have the power to promote the health, 
safety, morals, and general welfare of their citizens, including enacting 
statutes that may impede on the liberty of some citizens.32 
The origins of civil commitment in the United States date back to 
fifteenth-century London.33  In 1403, London’s Bedlam Hospital opened 
the first inpatient asylum dedicated to individuals suffering from mental 
illnesses.34  Some centuries later, the first inpatient asylum emerged in the 
United States.35 
Before the development of inpatient asylums in the United States, 
however, individuals suffering from mental illnesses were often confined to 
 
 27. See Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7 
PSYCHIATRY 30, 31 (2010). 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 32. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 457 (1827). 
 33. See Testa & West, supra note 27, at 31–32. 
 34. See id.  The National Alliance on Mental Illness defines a mental illness as “a 
condition that impacts a person’s thinking, feeling or mood [and] may affect . . . his or her 
ability to relate to others and function on a daily basis.” Nat’l All. on Mental Illness, What Is 
Mental Illness?, MENTAL ILLNESSES, http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=By_ 
Illness (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/8C48-583L]. 
 35. See Testa & West, supra note 27, at 32; see also Stuart A. Anfang & Paul S. 
Appelbaum, Civil Commitment—The American Experience, 43 ISR. J. PSYCHIATRY & 
RELATED SCI. 209, 210 (2006) (noting that the first psychiatric admission to occur in the 
colonies was in 1752 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania). 
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prisons and homeless shelters.36  While in these settings, mentally ill 
patients rarely received treatment and were subject to dangerous and 
unhealthy living conditions.37  Further, the legal standard for civil 
commitment during this time was exceptionally archaic because there were 
no procedural safeguards in place to determine whether an individual 
actually required treatment.38  For example, in 1860, a clergyman confined 
his wife to an asylum for having an “unclean spirit,” as she was interested 
in exploring religious traditions outside the Presbyterian Church.39 
Nonetheless, by the nineteenth century, the first inpatient asylums were 
established in the United States.40  For example, between 1817 and 1824, 
Connecticut, New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania opened four 
privately funded asylums.41  Soon thereafter, many southern states opened 
public asylums, and the presence of state-run mental hospitals began to 
increase.42 
Along with an increase in the existence of asylums in the twentieth 
century came an increase in due process rights for the mentally ill.43  For 
example, numerous states implemented new legal safeguards, including the 
right to counsel and the right to be heard.44  In addition, the power to civilly 
commit an individual was removed from psychiatric professionals and 
given to judges and magistrates.45 
Although the implementation of legal safeguards had an impact, it was 
not until the 1960s that states began to establish rigid legal requirements for 
the civil commitment of the mentally ill.46  The most famous case regarding 
such requirements, O’Connor v. Donaldson,47 was decided in 1975.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court held that an individual could not be civilly committed 
based solely on a psychiatric professional’s finding that an individual 
suffers from a mental illness.48  The Court explained that there was no 
constitutional foundation for civilly committing a mentally ill individual 
who is not dangerous and can live safely on his or her own.49 
The Court in O’Connor ruled that in order for an individual to be 
involuntarily hospitalized against his or her will, it must be shown that (1) 
the individual suffers from a mental illness and (2) the individual poses a 
 
 36. See Testa & West, supra note 27, at 32; see also Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 
35, at 209. 
 37. See Testa & West, supra note 27, at 32. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. at 33; see also Philip Fennel & Robert Lloyd Goldstein, The Application of 
Civil Commitment Law and Practices to a Case of Delusional Disorder:  A Cross-National 
Comparison of Legal Approaches in the United States and the United Kingdom, 24 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 385, 386–87 (2006). 
 47. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
 48. See id. at 575. 
 49. See id. 
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danger to himself or others.50  The burden of proof for these criteria varies 
among the states; however, the Court ruled that requiring proof by “clear, 
unequivocal and convincing evidence” is constitutionally sound.51 
2.  The Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders 
Throughout the twentieth century, the government became increasingly 
involved in the regulation of the civil commitment of the mentally ill.52  As 
a result of this increased regulation, the government learned more about the 
mentally ill and the different populations that suffer from mental illness.53  
One specific subset of the mentally ill—sex offenders—stood out to the 
government, as they “f[e]ll at the intersection between psychiatry and law” 
and posed a unique problem to society.54 
The earliest statutes calling for the civil commitment of sex offenders 
date back to the 1930s, when there was a surge in research on whether 
criminal conduct could be explained by medical conditions.55  These 
statutes, however, were ultimately unsuccessful as they were overbroad and 
deprived the accused of basic individual liberties, such as the “right to a 
trial, with attorney representation, prior to psychiatric admission.”56 
A few decades later, in the 1960s, twenty-six states and the District of 
Columbia passed statutes permitting the civil commitment of an individual 
found to be a “sexual psychopath.”57  These statutes, however, called for 
civil commitment as an alternative to criminal sentences, not as a post-
release condition.58 
As a result of these statutes, new research emerged regarding sex 
offenders’ responses to treatment.59  By 1970, because a substantial amount 
of this research showed that sex offenders were not responding to the 
 
 50. See id. 
 51. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979). 
 52. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 35, at 210–12; Fennel & Lloyd, supra note 
46, at 386–88; Testa & West, supra note 27, at 32–34. 
 53. See Testa & West, supra note 27, at 35. 
 54. Id.  The U.S. government defines a sex offender as “an individual who was 
convicted of a sex offense.” 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2012).  The term “sex offense” is defined 
broadly, including “a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual 
contact with another” and “a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor.” Id.  
The broadness of the definition of both “sex offender” and “sex offense” has caused 
substantial controversy among legal scholars, which, however, is beyond the scope of this 
Note. See Katherine Godin, The New Scarlet Letter:  Are We Taking the Sex Offender Label 
Too Far?, 60 R.I. B.J. 17, 19–20 (2011); see also Marion Buckley & J. Michael True, “Sex 
Offenders” but No Sex Crime?  What SORA and VOYRA Could Mean for Your Clients, 95 
ILL. B.J. 482, 484–85 (2007). 
 55. See Jeslyn A. Miller, Sex Offender Civil Commitment:  The Treatment Paradox, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 2093, 2096 (2010). 
 56. See Testa & West, supra note 27, at 32. 
 57. See Miller, supra note 55, at 2096. 
 58. See id. at 2097. 
 59. See id. 
2015] HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN SEX OFFENDER HEARINGS  245 
treatment provided in civil commitment programs, such programs fell out of 
favor, and instead there was “a shift toward determinative sentencing.”60 
Two decades later, the first statute calling for the civil commitment of 
sex offenders nearing release from prison was enacted in the United 
States.61  This statute was enacted in the state of Washington and permits 
the state to keep sex offenders in custody when it can be shown that they 
are likely to engage in sexually violent behavior.62  Today, twenty states 
and the federal government have similar statutes.63 
Although state law varies, most states require that an individual be (1) a 
convicted sex offender (2) suffering from a mental abnormality (3) that 
predisposes him or her to engage in sexual violence.64  In Kansas v. 
Hendricks,65 the Supreme Court held that such statutes are constitutional, 
despite numerous arguments regarding “due process, double jeopardy, and 
ex post facto” challenges.66 
The Hendricks decision places great emphasis on the state’s requirement 
that, in order for civil commitment proceedings to take place, a convicted 
sex offender must suffer from a mental abnormality.67  A mental 
abnormality is generally defined as a “condition, disease or disorder . . . that 
predisposes [a sex offender] to the commission of conduct constituting a 
sex offense and that results in that person having serious difficulty in 
controlling such conduct.”68  Examples of mental abnormalities that qualify 
 
 60. Id.  A determinative, or determinate, sentence is a fixed sentence set for a number of 
years in jail or prison, which can only be shortened by credit for time served, good time, and 
work time. ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 4:3 (3d ed. 2004).  Determinate 
sentences are contrasted with indeterminate sentences, which, instead of consisting of a fixed 
number of years, set forth a minimum and maximum range a prisoner will serve. Id. 
 61. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010–.903 (West 2008); see also Miller, supra note 
55, at 2097. 
 62. §§ 71.09.010–.903. 
 63. See Miller, supra note 55, at 2098; see also 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2012); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to -3717 (2009); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–6609.3 (West 
2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910–.932 (West 2011); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
205/1.01–205/12 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229A.1–.16 (West 2006); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a22 (West 2008); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123A, §§ 1–16 
(LexisNexis 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 253D.01–.36 (West Supp. 2014); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§§ 632.480–.513 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-1201 to -1228 (LexisNexis 
2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-E:1–24 (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-
27.24–.38 (West 2008); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01–.17 (McKinney 2011); N.D. 
CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-01 to -23 (2002); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6401–
6409 (West 2013); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (2002); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE ANN. §§ 841.001–.150 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-900 to -921 (2011); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010–.903; WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01–.14 (West 2007). 
 64. See Miller, supra note 55, at 2098.  For the remainder of this Note, male pronouns 
will be used in the context of the civil commitment of dangerous sex offenders, as no female 
sex offender has ever been civilly committed in the state of New York. 
 65. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 66. See id. at 350; see also John M. Fabian, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond:   
“Mental Abnormality,” and “Sexual Dangerousness”:  Volition Vs. Emotional Abnormality 
and the Debate Between Community Safety and Civil Liberties, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1367, 1373 (2003); Vanginderen, supra note 20, at 364–71. 
 67. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357–59. 
 68. MENTAL HYG. § 10.03. 
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under many civil commitment statutes include pedophilia, bestiality, 
exhibitionism, bondage, and sadomasochism.69 
Contrary to popular belief, not all sex offenders suffer from mental 
abnormalities.70  In fact, various studies report low rates of mental illness in 
the sex offender population.71  Nonetheless, experts have found that sex 
offenders who do suffer from mental abnormalities, such as the ones 
outlined above, are more likely to engage in violent crime.72  They are also 
more likely to be involved in the criminal justice system as well as engaged 
in violent behavior,73 and it is this type of behavior that Hendricks aims to 
reduce.74 
3.  New York State’s Response to Kansas v. Hendricks 
After the Court in Kansas v. Hendricks ruled that the civil commitment 
of sex offenders was constitutional, numerous states enacted legislation 
targeting dangerous sex offenders suffering from mental abnormalities.75  
For example, on April 13, 2007, New York State enacted Chapter 27, Title 
B, Article § 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law, also known as the Sex Offender 
Management and Treatment Act76 (“Article § 10”)  Although prompted by 
the holding in Kansas v. Hendricks, Article § 10 was also enacted largely in 
response to the murder of Concetta Russo Carriero.77 
On the morning of June 29, 2005, the New York State Police Department 
found a 56-year-old “petite blond woman” lying in a pool of blood near a 
popular mall.78  Hours later, police confronted a shirtless homeless man 
soaked in blood, who thereafter admitted that, at the time Carriero was 
 
 69. See State v. Peter Y., 952 N.Y.S.2d 651, 652–53 (App. Div. 2012); see also Sean 
Ahlmeyer et al., Psychopathology of Incarcerated Sex Offenders, 17 J. PERSONALITY 
DISORDERS 306, 307 (2003). 
 70. See Seena Fazel et al., Severe Mental Illness and Risk of Sexual Offending in Men:  
A Case-Control Study Based on Swedish National Registers, 68 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 
588, 588 (2007). 
 71. See, e.g., Ahlmeyer et al., supra note 69, at 315. 
 72. See Fazel et al., supra note 70, at 593. 
 73. See Andrew J. Harris et al., Sex Offending and Serious Mental Illness:  Directions 
for Policy and Research, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 596, 603 (2010). 
 74. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997). 
 75. See Miller, supra note 55, at 2100.  This is not to say such statutes were never 
challenged on constitutional grounds. See State v. Nelson, 932 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43–44 (App. 
Div. 2011) (rejecting ex post facto, due process, and equal protection arguments); see also 
Pratt v. Hogan, 631 F. Supp. 2d 192, 198–99 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding sex offender 
treatment program not in violation of First and Fifth Amendments); State v. Robert V., No. 
251233, 2010 WL 4904400, at *2–6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 29, 2011) (finding, as in Nelson, ex 
post facto arguments against Article § 10 without merit). 
 76. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01–.17 (McKinney 2011); see infra Part I.C. 
 77. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF MENTAL HYGIENE LAW ARTICLE 10:  SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT 
AND TREATMENT ACT OF 2007 3 (2009), http://roc.democratandchronicle.com/assets/pdf/ 
A21683261224.pdf [http://perma.cc/AAM5-NU5X]. 
 78. Anahad O’Connor, Homeless Man Goes on Trial in Hate-Crime Murder, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 13, 2006), www.nytimes.com/2006/06/13/nyregion/13grant.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/9MPQ-A5D9]. 
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killed, he was hiding in a mall stairwell, waiting to kill someone.79  That 
someone was soon identified as Concetta Russo Carriero, a paralegal from 
White Plains, New York.80 
The shirtless homeless man was later identified as Phillip Grant, a level-
three81 sex offender who was released from prison after serving a twenty-
three year sentence for two rape convictions and an attempted assault 
conviction.82  As a result of this highly publicized case, local officials and 
state legislators were prompted to reconsider New York State’s civil 
confinement laws.83 
The first piece of proposed legislation regarding the civil commitment of 
dangerous sex offenders, “Concetta’s Law,” was ultimately unsuccessful as 
the State Assembly and Senate were unable to reach a consensus on the 
proposed bill.84  As a result, Governor Pataki ordered the Office of Mental 
Health and the Department of Corrections to utilize Article § 985 of the 
Mental Hygiene Law in order to civilly commit dangerous sex offenders.86 
In November 2005, Mental Hygiene Legal Services (MHLS) challenged 
Governor Pataki’s order to utilize Article § 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law to 
civilly commit dangerous sex offenders.87  The issue reached the Court of 
Appeals one year later.  In State ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio,88 the court 
held that Article § 9 cannot control the civil commitment of sex offenders.89  
Instead, the state must file for the civil commitment of dangerous sex 
offenders under Correction Law § 402, which provides additional 
procedural requirements to ensure due process of law.90 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Level-three sex offenders are at the highest risk of all sex offenders to reoffend and 
are considered threats to public safety. Risk Level & Designation Determination, N.Y. STATE 
DIV. CRIM. JUST. SERVS., http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/nsor/risk_levels.htm (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/U2MK-WFKU]. 
 82. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 77, at 3. 
 83. See O’Connor, supra note 78; see also N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
supra note 77, at 3 (stating that after Carriero’s murder, Governor Pataki issued a series of 
“gubernatorial directives” calling for a reassessment of the civil commitment of dangerous 
sex offenders nearing release from prison). 
 84. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 77, at 3. 
 85. Article § 9 governs the hospitalization of the mentally ill, generally. N.Y. MENTAL 
HYG. LAW §§ 9.01–.63 (McKinney 2011).  In order to civilly commit an individual under 
Article § 9, two of the individual’s examining physicians must certify that the individual 
suffers from a mental illness and requires treatment and care. Id. § 9.27.  Further, a person 
familiar with the individual must apply for the individual’s admission, outlining the reasons 
he or she believes that the individual suffers from a mental illness and requires treatment and 
care. Id. 
 86. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 77, at 3. 
 87. See id. at 4.  Governor Pataki’s order was unique and thus likely to be challenged 
because no other state had ever utilized an existing statute to address the civil commitment 
of sex offenders. See id. at 3.  Further, no other statute permitted the civil commitment of sex 
offenders without judicial oversight. See id. 
 88. 859 N.E.2d 508 (N.Y. 2006). 
 89. Id. at 512. 
 90. See id. 
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Only one month after MHLS challenged Governor Pataki’s order on 
procedural grounds, MHLS brought an action against the state arguing that 
the civil commitment of sex offenders violates an individual’s right to 
liberty.91  This case eventually made it up to the Court of Appeals; 
however, it was interrupted by New York State’s enactment of the Sex 
Offender Management and Treatment Act.92 
After Harkavy, it became clear to the legislature that, although it would 
not be easy, the state would have to enact legislation specifically addressing 
the civil commitment of dangerous sex offenders.93  As a result, on April 
13, 2007, Article § 10 of the New York State Mental Hygiene Law went 
into effect.94 
Before examining Article § 10 and its requirements, an understanding of 
the laws that govern civil commitment statutes is necessary.  The following 
section will address these laws generally, as well as specifically in New 
York State. 
B.  Governing Laws of Sex Offender Civil Commitment Statutes 
Part I.B examines the laws that govern civil commitment statutes 
generally, first addressing the Constitution’s Confrontation Clause.  It then 
explores New York State’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, specifically New 
York State’s general rule against hearsay and its exceptions. 
1.  The Confrontation Clause 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him.”95  The Confrontation Clause is derived from this 
amendment.96  The Confrontation Clause requires that individuals accused 
of criminal offenses be able to question and cross examine their accusers in 
open court.97  Therefore, victims of crimes may be subpoenaed and forced 
to testify in order to comply with the Confrontation Clause.98  The Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Confrontation Clause to apply to both federal and 
state criminal proceedings.99 
 
 91. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 77, at 4; see also State ex 
rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio, 870 N.E.2d 128, 131 (N.Y. 2007). 
 92. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 77, at 4. 
 93. See generally Michael Cooper & Danny Hakim, Accord on Bill to Detain Sex 
Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2007), www.nytimes.com/2007/03/01/nyregion/01civil. 
html?fta=y&_r=0 (explaining that it was not until Eliot Spitzer became governor that the 
democratic-led assembly agreed to enact such legislation) [http://perma.cc/6APE-43Y8].  
The question of whether convicted sex offenders could be civilly committed after they serve 
their time was, and remains, an extremely controversial topic in American politics. See id. 
 94. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01–.17 (McKinney 2011). 
 95. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 96. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). 
 97. Id.; see also Martin A. Hewett, A More Reliable Right to Present a Defense:  The 
Compulsory Process Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 96 GEO. L.J. 273, 274–75 
(2007). 
 98. See Hewett, supra note 97, at 275. 
 99. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). 
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The Court has also held, however, that the accused’s right to 
confrontation is not absolute.100  For example, in the landmark case of 
Maryland v. Craig,101 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that children who 
are victims of sexual abuse might suffer severe trauma from testifying in 
open court, which may justify implementing “special procedures” regarding 
live confrontation.102  As discussed in Part III.B of this Note, children, by 
confronting their abusers, may be reexposed to feelings of betrayal, 
helplessness, and powerlessness as memories of the abuse are forced to the 
forefront of their minds.103 
In October 1986, Sandra Ann Craig was charged with child abuse, first- 
and second-degree sexual offenses, perverted sexual practice, assault, and 
battery for sexually abusing a six-year-old girl who attended Craig’s pre-
kindergarten and kindergarten center.104  In March 1987, the State asked the 
judge if, at trial, the child could testify per one-way closed circuit television 
(CCTV) to eliminate the need for the child to confront her abuser.105 
One-way CCTV involves one camera and one monitor.106  The judge, 
prosecutor, defense attorney, and witness sit in one room with the camera, 
and the jury and defendant sit in the courtroom with the monitor.107  The 
witness is subject to direct and cross examination; however, because the 
witness is not present in the courtroom, the witness does not have to see his 
or her abuser.108  The defendant must be able to communicate with his or 
her attorney at all times.109 
In Craig, the trial court permitted the six-year-old girl to testify via one-
way CCTV, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s decision.110  The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and 
remanded, holding that permitting the child to testify via one-way CCTV 
violated the defendant’s right to confrontation.111  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.112 
After hearing arguments from both the State and Craig, the Supreme 
Court held that, if the state adequately shows that it is necessary to 
implement “special procedures” (i.e., using one-way CCTV) in order to 
protect a child from the trauma of testifying in open court, there is no 
violation of a defendant’s right to confrontation.113  The Court reasoned 
that, in some cases, “a State’s interest in the physical and psychological 
 
 100. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 101. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
 102. Id. at 855. 
 103. See infra note 391 and accompanying text. 
 104. Craig, 497 U.S. at 840. 
 105. Id. 
 106. NAT’L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE & NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, 
CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION STATUTES 1 (2012). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Craig, 497 U.S. at 843. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 855. 
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well-being” of child victims of sexual assault outweighs the right to face-to-
face confrontation.114  The Court supported its decision by citing to the 
conclusions set forth in an amicus curiae brief115 filed by the American 
Psychological Association.116  The American Psychological Association 
urged the Court to adopt special procedures avoiding live confrontation 
because legal proceedings are particularly stressful for children who are 
victims of sexual assault, and such stress may negatively impact their 
“normal cognitive and emotional development.”117 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Craig that the right to confrontation is 
not absolute has had a significant impact on the defendant’s right to 
confrontation in child abuse cases.118  Craig’s holding validated thirty-
seven states’ authorization of the use of videotaped testimony in child abuse 
cases,119 twenty-four states’ authorization of the use of one-way CCTV,120 
and eight states’ authorization of the use of two-way CCTV.121 
 
 114. Id. at 853; see also Spigarolo v. Meachum, 934 F.2d 19, 24–25 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(holding that because child victims would suffer trauma from testifying in front of their 
abusers, videotaped testimony could be used). 
 115. An amicus curiae brief is a brief submitted to the court by a nonparty with a 
particular interest in the case; the nonparty must get the court’s permission to file. Amicus 
Curiae, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/amicus 
%20curiae (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/SDX6-XVYA]. 
 116. See Brief for American Psychological Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither 
Party, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (No. 89–478). 
 117. Id. at 7. 
 118. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 850; see also L. Christine Brannon, The Trauma of Testifying 
in Court for Child Victims of Sexual Assault V. the Accused’s Right to Confrontation, 18 
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 439, 446–48 (1994). 
 119. Craig, 497 U.S. at 853; see also ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (LexisNexis 2011); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (1999); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1346 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-413, 18-6-401.3 (2013); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 92.53 (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626-1, Rule 616 (West 2008); 725 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/106B-5 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (LexisNexis 2012); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.38 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (West 2008); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (LexisNexis 2005); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16D (LexisNexis 
2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2163a(5) (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 
(West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-407 (West 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 491.675–.725 
(West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-402 (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-
1926 (LexisNexis 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 174.227–.231 (LexisNexis 2011); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (LexisNexis 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (West 2003); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.481 (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2611.3–
.11 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.460 (West 2003); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 5984.1 (West 2013); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
3-1550 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-12-9 (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-7-117, -
120 (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 967.04 (West 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-408 (2013); 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (West 2005); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 15.5; VT. R. EVID. 
807. 
 120. Craig, 497 U.S. at 853–54; see also ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (LexisNexis 2011); 
ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (2010); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 17-8-55 (2013); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/106B-5 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
37-4-8 (LexisNexis 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.38 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
3434 (West 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (LexisNexis 2005); LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 15:283 (2007); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16D (LexisNexis 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 595.02 (West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
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Shortly after Craig, Congress enacted the Child Victims’ and Child 
Witnesses’ Rights Act.122  The Child Victims’ and Child Witnesses’ Rights 
Act permits child victims to either testify via two-way CCTV123 or by 
videotaped depositions.124  In United States v. Farley,125 the defendant 
challenged the constitutionality of this statute; however, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld its constitutionality because the state 
could show, in that specific case, that the child victim would be emotionally 
incapable of testifying in front of her abuser.126  The court held that, 
because a psychologist’s testimony sufficiently established that the victim 
would be overcome with fear, and thus severely traumatized from 
confronting her abuser, there was no Sixth Amendment violation.127 
2.  New York State’s Civil Practice Law and Rules:  
The General Rule Against Hearsay 
In criminal proceedings, the accused are most often, but not always, 
guaranteed the right to confront their accusers.128  The Confrontation 
Clause does not, however, apply to civil proceedings.129  Rather, in New 
York State civil proceedings, the accused are afforded the protections 
outlined in the New York State Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR).130  
One of the most pertinent rules for civil commitment cases under the CPLR 
is New York State’s general rule against hearsay.131 
 
§ 2A:84A-32.4 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2611.3–.11 (West 2009); OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.460 (West 2003); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985 (West 
2013); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-303 
(LexisNexis 2008); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (West 2005); UTAH R. CRIM. 
P. 15.5; VT. R. EVID. 807. 
 121. Craig, 497 U.S. at 854; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West 2004); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 626-1, Rule 616 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 9-1801 to -1808 (2010); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.481 (LexisNexis 
2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (2009); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00–.30 (McKinney 
2004); VT. R. EVID. 807. 
 122. 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2012). 
 123. Id. § 3509(b)(1).  When a child testifies via two-way CCTV, the child sits in a room 
with the prosecutor and the defense attorney. See Aaron Harmon, Child Testimony via Two-
Way Closed Circuit Television:  A New Perspective on Maryland v. Craig in United States v. 
Turning Bear and United States v. Bordeaux, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 157, 157–58 (2005).  The 
child’s testimony is recorded and live streamed to the courtroom, where the defendant is also 
being recorded. Id.  The child is able to view the defendant on a monitor, and the defendant 
is able to view the child on a monitor. Id. 
 124. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(2). 
 125. 992 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 126. Id. at 1125. 
 127. Id. at 1124–25. 
 128. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990). 
 129. DEBORAH J. MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE:  FROM THE FEDERAL 
RULES TO THE COURTROOM 701 (2d ed. 2011); see also David Alan Sklansky, Confrontation 
and Fairness, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 103, 110 (2012) (explaining that even in high-stakes 
civil cases, such as cases involving civil commitment, the Confrontation Clause is 
inapplicable). 
 130. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 101 (MCKINNEY 2003). 
 131. See People v. Edwards, 392 N.E.2d 1229, 1230–31 (N.Y. 1979). 
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Hearsay evidence is defined as “(1) an out-of-court assertion that is (2) 
offered to prove its truth.”132  The Federal Rules of Evidence expand on this 
definition, defining hearsay as “a statement that:  (1) the declarant does not 
make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and [that] (2) a party 
offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the 
statement.”133 
In general, statements about whether something is true that are not made 
in court and subject to cross examination are considered hearsay 
evidence.134  Thus, such statements are inadmissible in court.135  Hearsay 
evidence is generally inadmissible because it is thought to be 
untrustworthy—it is not made under oath, in the presence of the trier of 
fact, or subject to cross examination.136  New York State, however, has 
carved out certain exceptions to the general rule against hearsay.137 
3.  New York State’s Exceptions to the General Rule Against Hearsay 
Part I.B.3 presents four exceptions to New York State’s general rule 
against hearsay:  (1) the professional reliability exception, (2) the exception 
for excited utterances, (3) the exception for statements made for purposes of 
medical treatment or diagnosis, and (4) the exception for when the 
defendant causes the declarant’s unavailability. 
a.  The Professional Reliability Exception 
The professional reliability exception states that a “psychiatrist may rely 
on material, albeit of out-of-court origin, if it is of a kind accepted in the 
profession as reliable in forming a professional opinion” or if it “comes 
from a witness subject to full cross examination on the trial.”138  Under the 
professional reliability exception, hearsay evidence may only be used in 
forming an expert’s opinion and may not be introduced to establish the 
validity of the evidence.139 
There are two ways to satisfy the professional reliability exception.140  
The first way provides that, in forming their opinions, psychiatric 
examiners may rely on documents that are traditionally relied upon by 
experts in the field.141  It is up to the court to determine whether such 
documents are traditionally relied upon,142 and the jury is explicitly 
 
 132. DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK § 1:1 (4th ed. 2001). 
 133. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
 134. See Edwards, 392 N.E.2d at 1230–31. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See BINDER, supra note 132, § 3:2. 
 137. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 138. People v. Sugden, 323 N.E.2d 169, 173 (N.Y. 1974) (establishing the professional 
reliability exception). 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See Hambsch v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 469 N.E.2d 516, 517–18 (N.Y. 1984). 
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instructed that a psychiatric examiner’s reliance on a document does not 
establish its validity.143 
The second way to satisfy the professional reliability exception pertains 
to witnesses subject to “full cross-examination on the trial.”144  The 
rationale behind this exception is that testimony about statements made 
outside of court can be verified and/or challenged during cross 
examination.145 
b.  The Exception for Excited Utterances 
New York State also recognizes an exception to the general rule against 
hearsay for excited utterances.146  An excited utterance is an out-of-court 
statement made when an individual is in a stressful, startling situation.147  
The justification for admitting excited utterances into evidence is that, due 
to the nature of a stressful, startling situation, the individual making the 
statement is incapable of altering the truth.148 
In determining whether the excited utterance exception applies, the main 
focus is the mental state of the declarant.149  Other considerations include 
the time between the startling event and the declaration, whether the 
declarant was questioned, and whether the declarant was, at the time of the 
declaration, suffering from a serious injury.150  Although these factors 
should be considered in making the determination of whether an excited 
utterance is admissible, no one factor alone is dispositive.151  The critical 
question remains:  “whether the declarant is capable of studied reflection 
and therefore incapable of fabrication.”152 
For example, in People v. Powell,153 the New York State Appellate 
Division affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit hearsay evidence 
pursuant to the excited utterance exception.154  On November 2, 1998, the 
 
 143. See State v. Wilkes, 908 N.Y.S.2d 495, 497 (App. Div. 2010); People v. Campbell, 
602 N.Y.S.2d 282, 284 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that “hearsay testimony given by experts 
is admissible for the limited purpose of informing the jury of the basis of the expert’s 
opinion and not for the truth of the matters related”). 
 144. See Sugden, 323 N.E.2d at 173. 
 145. See Elliott Scheinberg, Hearsay Testimony Through the Expert Witness, 86 N.Y. ST. 
B.J. 35, 36 (2014).  In general, the professional reliability exception is highly debated among 
legal scholars; however, such debates are beyond the scope of this Note. See id. at 36–42; 
see also John M. Curran, The “Professional Reliability” Basis for Expert Opinion 
Testimony, 85 N.Y. ST. B.J. 22, 24–25 (2013); Colleen D. Duffy, The Admissibility of Expert 
Opinion and the Bases of Expert Opinion in Sex Offender Civil Management Trials in New 
York, 75 ALB. L. REV. 763, 773 (2012). 
 146. People v. Johnson, 804 N.E.2d 402, 405 (N.Y. 2003); see also 5A ROBERT A. 
BARKER & VINCENT C. ALEXANDER, EVIDENCE IN NEW YORK STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 
§ 8:31 (2d ed. 2011). 
 147. Johnson, 804 N.E.2d at 405. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 405–06. 
 151. See id. at 406. 
 152. Id. 
 153. 732 N.Y.S.2d 216 (App. Div. 2001). 
 154. Id. at 216. 
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defendant, Bobby Powell, was convicted of first-degree rape for raping his 
neighbor at knifepoint.155  Almost immediately after being raped, the 
complainant made four statements that the defendant argued were 
inadmissible hearsay.156  The complainant’s first statement was to her 
roommate, telling her that she had been raped.157  The second statement 
was to the building’s supervisor, identifying Bobby Powell as her rapist.158  
The third and fourth statements were made to police officers, telling them 
that she had been raped and identifying Bobby Powell as her rapist.159 
The Supreme Court admitted all four statements into evidence under the 
hearsay exception for excited utterances, and the Appellate Division 
affirmed.160  The Appellate Division reasoned that because the complainant 
spoke under extreme stress from a forcible rape, the complainant was 
incapable of reflection and distorting the truth.161  The Appellate Division 
elaborated that, because the amount of time between the rape and the 
statements was relatively short, the witnesses agreed on the timing of the 
statements, and the complainant was “still crying, shaking and very upset,” 
the complainant’s statements were admissible hearsay under the exception 
for excited utterances.162 
The court in Powell not only admitted into evidence statements about 
whether a rape occurred, but also statements identifying the complainant’s 
rapist.163  This holding suggests that under certain conditions, courts will 
extend great latitude in determining whether the excited utterance exception 
applies.164 
c.  The Exception for Statements Made for Purposes  
of Medical Treatment or Diagnosis 
Another exception to the general rule against hearsay is the exception for 
statements made for the purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis.165  
Although New York State’s recognition of this exception is relatively new, 
New York State courts have admitted statements made for the purposes of 
medical treatment or diagnosis pertaining to the way in which an individual 
was injured166 as well as the cause of an individual’s injury.167 
 
 155. See Powell v. Greiner, No. 02 Civ. 7352(LBS), 2003 WL 359466, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 18, 2003). 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. 
 160. People v. Powell, 732 N.Y.S.2d 216, 216 (App. Div. 2001). 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 146, § 8:33. 
 166. See People v. Dennee, 738 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (App. Div. 2002) (holding that the 
physician’s testimony regarding the declarant’s description of the manner in which the 
declarant was injured was admissible under the hearsay exception for statements made for 
purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis); Scott v. Mason, 547 N.Y.S.2d 889, 891 (App. 
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In most cases, the name of an individual who has injured or harmed a 
declarant has not been admitted under the exception for statements made for 
the purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis.168  In domestic violence and 
child abuse cases, however, courts have been more lenient.169 
For example, in People v. Ortega,170 the Court of Appeals admitted into 
evidence statements explicitly identifying the defendant as the abuser 
because such statements were made during the complainant’s treatment for 
domestic violence.171  The court went a step further in holding that another 
complainant’s statements identifying the defendant as the person who 
forced the complainant to “smoke a white, powdery substance” was also 
admissible as it was relevant to the complainant’s treatment at the 
hospital.172 
In two additional cases, People v. Spicola173 and People v. Duhs,174 the 
Court of Appeals permitted statements identifying two child abusers 
because the statements made identifying the defendants were “germane” to 
diagnosis and treatment.175  These rulings suggest a shift in the Court of 
Appeals toward a more liberal interpretation of the hearsay exception for 
statements made for purposes of medical treatment and diagnosis.176 
d.  The Exception for When a Party Causes the Declarant’s Unavailability 
One last exception to the general rule against hearsay evidence is the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence when the accused causes the declarant’s 
unavailability.177  The New York State Court of Appeals defines “causing 
the declarant’s unavailability” as being “responsible for or [acquiescing] in 
the conduct” that made the witness unavailable for trial.178  Most 
commonly, such “conduct” consists of intimidation or violence,179 but it 
may also take the form of threats, chicanery, or bribery.180 
In specific circumstances, courts have interpreted the exception for the 
admissibility of hearsay when the defendant causes the declarant’s 
unavailability more broadly.181  For example, in People v. Byrd,182 the 
Appellate Division concluded that, although the defendant did not explicitly 
 
Div. 1989) (holding that the physician’s testimony regarding the declarant’s description that 
his van was hit by some sort of motor vehicle was admissible under the hearsay exception). 
 167. See People v. Thomas, 725 N.Y.S.2d 102, 104 (App. Div. 2001). 
 168. See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 146, § 8:33. 
 169. See id. 
 170. 942 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 2010). 
 171. Id. at 215. 
 172. Id. at 216. 
 173. 947 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 2011). 
 174. 947 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 2011). 
 175. Id. at 618; Spicola, 947 N.E.2d at 625. 
 176. See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 146, § 8:33. 
 177. See People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 824 (N.Y. 1995). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 820. 
 180. See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 146, § 8:97. 
 181. See infra notes 184, 186 and accompanying text. 
 182. 855 N.Y.S.2d 505 (App. Div. 2008). 
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coerce the complainant into refusing to testify, hearsay evidence was 
nonetheless admissible.183  Because the complainant suffered from battered 
person syndrome stemming from years of physical and emotional abuse, the 
court determined that the defendant caused the complainant’s unavailability 
and admitted the hearsay evidence.184 
Similarly, in People v. Jernigan,185 the Appellate Division concluded that 
it was unnecessary to show that the defendant made threats against the 
declarant in order for the hearsay exception to apply.186  Instead, if the 
declarant would feel pressured not to testify because of a prior abusive 
relationship, the hearsay exception would apply.187 
In both Byrd and Jernigan, the complainants endured serious abuse by 
the defendants.188  The facts of these cases suggest that, in the absence of 
explicit threats, violence, or intimidation, the admissibility of hearsay when 
a defendant causes a declarant’s unavailability should be determined on a 
case-by-case basis with regard for the severity of the underlying facts.189  
This is particularly relevant in sex offender civil commitment cases, which 
involve repeat, chronic sex offenders who commit serious crimes against 
their victims.190 
After fully understanding the laws and rules that apply to civil 
commitment proceedings, it is then possible to explore the substance of 
New York State’s Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act.  In the 
following section, each part of this statute is thoroughly examined. 
C.  New York State’s Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act 
The New York State legislature cites numerous reasons for the enactment 
of Article § 10.191  First and foremost, the legislature explains that certain 
sex offenders pose a threat to society that should be addressed by sex 
offender programs and treatment.192  The legislature goes on to explain that, 
because the civil and criminal systems have different goals, both systems 
should be used in tandem in order to “respond to current needs of individual 
offenders,” “provide meaningful treatment,” and “protect the public.”193 
The legislature is careful to note that Article § 10 addresses sex offenders 
with mental abnormalities that make them more likely to commit repeated 
sex offenses.194  Further, because some sex offenders suffering from certain 
mental abnormalities require specific, elongated treatment, such treatment 
 
 183. See id. at 507, 510. 
 184. Id. 
 185. 838 N.Y.S.2d 81 (App. Div. 2007). 
 186. Id. at 82. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Byrd, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 507; Jernigan, 838 N.Y.S.2d at 82. 
 189. See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 146, § 8:97. 
 190. See S. 3318, 230th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 61 (N.Y. 2007). 
 191. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01 (McKinney 2011). 
 192. Id. § 10.01(a). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. § 10.01(b). 
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may only be accomplished through the civil process after a sex offender’s 
release from prison.195 
Civil commitment is not the only solution the legislature proposes under 
Article § 10.196  In fact, the legislature recognizes that some sex offenders 
may be monitored in the community under strict and intensive supervision 
and treatment.197  Further, appropriate criminal sentences may be a way to 
address the problem of dangerous sex offenders.198  The determination of 
whether a sex offender should be civilly committed, released on community 
supervision, or given a longer sentence should be made with a consideration 
for “protect[ing] the public, reduc[ing] recidivism, and ensur[ing] offenders 
have access to proper treatment.”199 
All Article § 10 proceedings are prompted by a recommendation from the 
Office of Mental Health that a sex offender nearing release from prison is 
likely to suffer from a mental abnormality, which would make him likely to 
pose a danger to society.200  The Office of Mental Health receives notice 
that a detained sex offender is anticipating release201 from prison from any 
“agency with jurisdiction,” which is most often the Department of 
Corrections and Community Supervision.202  Once the Office of Mental 
Health is provided with notice that a detained sex offender is nearing 
release from prison, the commissioner of mental health is permitted to 
authorize an initial evaluation of that individual.203  If a preliminary review 
does take place, the initial evaluator is permitted to review all of the sex 
offender’s prior records.204  “If the case review team determines that the 
respondent is not a sex offender requiring civil management,” no petition 
will be filed, and the respondent will be released on his anticipated release 
 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. § 10.01(c). 
 197. Id.  On June 17, 2015, the New York State Assembly introduced a bill that would 
eliminate the alternative of strict and intensive supervision and treatment. N.Y. Assemb. 
8275, 238th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015).  Upon publication of this Note, the bill has yet to 
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 198. MENTAL HYG. § 10.01(d). 
 199. Id. § 10.01(c). 
 200. See id. § 10.05. 
 201. Various courts have had to interpret the meaning of “anticipating release” in various 
contexts. See State v. D.J., 873 N.Y.S.2d 482, 486 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (holding that because 
respondent was a voluntary patient who could seek release at any time, the State was not 
premature in its petition); State v. Swartz, 852 N.Y.S.2d 689, 692 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (ruling 
that Article § 10 does not set forth the earliest date the state can petition for the civil 
commitment of a dangerous sex offender). 
 202. MENTAL HYG. § 10.05(b). 
 203. Id. § 10.05(d).  A respondent is not entitled to counsel at a preliminary evaluation. 
See State v. John P., 982 N.E.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. 2012); State v. Timothy BB., 975 N.Y.S.2d 
237, 240–41 (App. Div. 2013) (holding that respondent “was not deprived of the effective 
assistance of counsel”); State v. Robert F., 958 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (App. Div. 2012); State v. 
Pierce, 914 N.Y.S.2d 547, 549 (App. Div. 2010). 
 204. MENTAL HYG. § 10.05(d).  Records include “relevant medical, clinical, criminal, and 
institutional records, actuarial risk assessment instruments and other records and reports, 
including records of parole release interviews . . . and records and reports provided by the 
district attorney of the county where the person was convicted, or . . . the county where the 
person was charged.” Id. 
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date.205  If the case review team does find that the respondent is a sex 
offender requiring civil management, the respondent and the attorney 
general will be notified,206 and the state may then file a petition for the civil 
commitment of the respondent.207 
Unlike during the preliminary evaluation conducted by the Office of 
Mental Health, a respondent is entitled to counsel as soon as the state files a 
petition against him.208  If a respondent cannot afford to hire his own 
counsel, counsel must be appointed to him.209  In most cases, an attorney 
from MHLS is appointed to a respondent.210  In the rare occasion that 
MHLS cannot take a case, a respondent will be appointed an 18-B 
lawyer.211 
After a respondent is appointed counsel, the state may request that a 
psychiatric professional, chosen by the state, evaluate the respondent.212  
Once the respondent has met with a state-chosen psychiatric professional, 
but no later than thirty days after the initial petition is filed, the court must 
conduct a probable cause hearing.213  Generally, a probable cause hearing 
consists primarily of expert witness testimony.214  A state-appointed 
psychiatric examiner, most often from the Office of Mental Health, will 
testify regarding whether she believes the respondent is more likely than not 
to suffer from a mental abnormality.215  The respondent may also call an 
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 208. Id. § 10.06(c). 
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Article § 9, there was no good cause to be evaluated again. No. 341104, 2008 WL 483750, at 
*2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 2008).  The court ruled against the respondent, holding that 
Article § 9 evaluations served a different purpose than Article § 10 evaluations. Id. at *3.  
The court has also held that under certain circumstances, a respondent may be subject to 
more than one evaluation. See State v. Richard Z., No. 2007-2605 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 1, 
2010); State v. Brian J., No. 2009-61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 2010).  Further, the court has 
held that the state may not videotape evaluations conducted by psychiatric examiners. See 
State v. Bernard D., 877 N.Y.S.2d 84, 84–85 (App. Div. 2009); In re Charles S., 875 
N.Y.S.2d 263, 263–64 (App. Div. 2009); State v. R.H., No. 002826, 2008 WL 4837632, at 
*1–4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 5, 2008); State v. Hall, No. 2424/07, 2007 WL 3306944, at *1–2 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 2007). 
 213. MENTAL HYG. § 10.06(g). 
 214. See id. §§ 10.06, 10.08. 
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2015] HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN SEX OFFENDER HEARINGS  259 
expert witness to testify on this issue.216  It is this expert testimony, based 
on an evaluation of the respondent, as well as any other relevant 
documents,217 that the court will use in making its determination.218  At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the court will either dismiss the petition and 
release the respondent in accordance with the law or order the respondent to 
a secure treatment facility, set a date for trial, and order the respondent not 
be released until the completion of trial.219 
Article § 10.07(a) states that, within sixty days after a probable cause 
hearing, the court must conduct a jury trial to determine whether the 
respondent is a detained sex offender suffering from a mental 
abnormality.220  Article § 10.07(b) sets forth the rules that govern the jury 
trial,221 and as in probable cause hearings, Article § 10.08(g) outlines the 
types of evidence admissible at trial.222  Further, also as in probable cause 
hearings, the jury will generally hear one expert witness on behalf of the 
state and one expert witness on behalf of the respondent.223  After both 
sides are fully heard by the jury, the jury will determine “by clear and 
convincing evidence whether the respondent is a detained sex offender who 
suffers from a mental abnormality.”224 
If the jury determines that the state has not met its burden, the respondent 
should be released in full accordance with the law.225  If the jury 
unanimously finds that the state has met its burden in showing that the 
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respondent is a detained sex offender suffering from a mental abnormality, 
the court must then hold a dispositional hearing.226 
If the jury determines that the respondent is a detained sex offender 
suffering from a mental abnormality, the court must determine whether the 
respondent is so dangerous that he requires inpatient treatment or whether 
he is suited to be released on strict and intensive supervision and 
treatment.227  At a dispositional hearing, both the state and the respondent 
are permitted to offer additional evidence pertaining to the issue of 
dangerousness.228  As during the trial phase, the standard of proof is clear 
and convincing evidence.229 
Article § 10.07(f) explains that, if the court finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that the respondent is so dangerous as to require confinement, the 
respondent will be sent to a secure facility for treatment until he no longer 
requires confinement.230  If a respondent is determined to require 
confinement, Article § 10.09 and Article § 10.10 govern his right to annual 
examinations and petitions for discharge,231 as well as for treatment and 
confinement, respectively.232 
If the court, however, does not find that a respondent is so dangerous as 
to require confinement, the court will order a respondent to be subject to 
“strict and intensive supervision” and treatment233 (SIST).  Article § 10.11 
governs the “regimen” of SIST.234  Generally, a respondent on strict and 
intensive supervision and treatment must abide by a list of roughly seventy 
conditions and, if found to be in violation of one or more conditions, risks 
being civilly committed to a secure treatment facility.235 
II.  AN EXAMINATION OF PERMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE AFTER  
STATE V. FLOYD Y. VERSUS THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE § 10 
Part I of this Note explored the history of civil commitment in the United 
States, the laws that govern civil commitment statutes, and New York 
State’s Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act.  Part II begins with a 
thorough examination of the admissibility of hearsay evidence in New York 
State civil commitment hearings under the Sex Offender Management and 
Treatment Act both before and after the New York State Court of Appeals 
decision in State v. Floyd Y.  It then explores the Floyd Y. decision as it 
relates to the Confrontation Clause, New York State’s Civil Practice Law 
and Rules, and Article § 10’s legislative intent. 
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A.  The Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence  
in Article § 10 Cases and State v. Floyd Y. 
Part II.A first outlines what types of evidence Article § 10 permits at civil 
commitment proceedings.  It then explores the events leading up to the 
Floyd Y. decision as well as the court’s holding. 
1.  Evidence Admissible Under Article § 10 
The most important piece of evidence in an Article § 10 proceeding is a 
psychiatric examiner’s report.236  A psychiatric examiner’s report outlines, 
in the examiner’s expert opinion, whether the respondent suffers from a 
mental abnormality and the evidence utilized to come to that 
determination.237  Article § 10.08(g) of the New York State Mental 
Hygiene Law, for both probable cause hearings and trials, mandates that, in 
three specific circumstances, any psychiatric examiner’s report, if relevant, 
is permissible regardless of whether the psychiatric examiner is available to 
testify.238  These three circumstances include (1) when the report is certified 
or authenticated by the “head of the hospital, laboratory, department or 
bureau of a municipal corporation or of the state, or by an employee 
delegated for that purpose or by a qualified physician,”239 (2) when the 
report is presented at a probable cause hearing,240 and (3) when the report is 
presented at a hearing regarding a respondent’s SIST.241  In all other cases, 
however, the psychiatric examiner must be able to testify or must be able to 
show good cause as to why she is not able to testify.242 
Article § 10.08(g) also states that any relevant documents and testimony 
regarding the respondent’s underlying criminal offenses are admissible.243  
While the types of evidence Article § 10.08(g) deems admissible may seem 
to encompass everything the attorney general would need to make a case, 
Article § 10.08(g) does not address the admissibility of hearsay evidence in 
Article § 10 cases.244 
As discussed in Part I.B.2 of this Note, hearsay evidence is defined as 
“(1) an out-of-court assertion that is (2) offered to prove its truth.”245  In 
civil cases, if a declarant of a statement is unable or unwilling to testify in 
court, the court must either find an exception to the hearsay rule for which 
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authentication by the head of the hospital, laboratory, department or bureau of a municipal 
corporation or of the state, or by an employee delegated for that purpose or by a qualified 
physician”). 
 240. See MENTAL HYG. § 10.06(g)–(h). 
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 245. See BINDER, supra note 132, § 1:1. 
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the statement applies or forego using such hearsay evidence.246  In the 
Article § 10 setting, the most pertinent exception to the general rule against 
hearsay is the professional reliability exception.247 
2.  Article § 10 and the Professional Reliability Exception 
Article § 10.08(g) describes which types of evidence are admissible at 
Article § 10 proceedings but fails to explicitly state whether hearsay 
evidence is admissible.248  This is a particularly important issue in Article 
§ 10 proceedings as psychiatric examiners, in forming their opinions about 
whether a respondent suffers from a mental abnormality, base their 
decisions not only on evaluations of respondents but also on respondents’ 
records.249  A respondent’s records may include materials from the 
Department of Corrections, medical records, pre-sentence reports, rap 
sheets, parole reports, police reports, Office of Mental Health records, court 
transcripts, and reports made by other psychiatric professionals.250 
Because many of these documents contain hearsay evidence and because 
Article § 10 does not explicitly contemplate the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence, courts have been charged with interpreting the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence in Article § 10 proceedings.251  Although Article § 10 
does not explicitly outline the admissibility of hearsay evidence,252 Article 
§ 10.07(c) states that Article § 10.08(g) and Article § 45 of the Civil 
Practice Law and Rules are applicable in Article § 10 proceedings.253  
Utilizing the guidance set forth in § 10.07(c), the court has determined that 
“[t]he inclusion of Article 45 as the evidentiary standard suggests that at an 
Article 10 trial, as a civil trial generally, hearsay should not generally be 
admissible.”254 
Nonetheless, the court has carved out certain exceptions for when 
hearsay evidence should be permitted.255  The most pertinent hearsay 
exception to Article § 10 cases is the “professional reliability exception.”256  
The professional reliability exception, which is defined in Part I.B.3.a of 
this Note, states that a “psychiatrist may rely on material, albeit of out-of-
court origin, if it is of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable in 
forming a professional opinion” or if it “comes from a witness subject to 
full cross-examination on the trial.”257 
 
 246. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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3.  Events Leading Up to the Floyd Y. Decision 
Almost immediately after the enactment of Article § 10, the professional 
reliability exception began to play an integral role in admitting hearsay 
evidence in Article § 10 proceedings.258  At trial, the state would generally 
contend that such hearsay was admissible, arguing it is consistent with the 
professional reliability exception to the hearsay rule.259  Conversely, the 
respondent would attempt to preclude such evidence, arguing that the state 
witness’s expert opinion was based on inadmissible hearsay evidence.260 
After a number of similar Article § 10 cases were decided, the court 
seemed to have outlined a bright-line rule regarding the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence.261  In State v. Pierce,262 the court held that because 
“parole board documents, pre-sentence reports, accusatory instruments, 
certificates of conviction, police reports and respondent’s criminal records” 
were of the kind normally relied upon by experts in forming their opinions, 
such records were admissible under the professional reliability exception.263  
Various New York State Supreme Courts have upheld Pierce’s ruling in 
subsequent Article § 10 proceedings.264 
One issue that the Pierce decision did not address, however, was whether 
hearsay evidence regarding charges that are eventually dropped or crimes 
with which an individual is never charged is admissible in court.265  This 
issue was first addressed in State v. Shawn X.,266 when the court held that 
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hearsay evidence regarding uncharged crimes is admissible as long as it is 
relevant and not “unduly prejudicial.”267 
In May 1992, Shawn X. was convicted of sodomy in the first degree, 
rape in the first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child.268  Shawn 
X. was sentenced to five to fifteen years in prison and was released on 
parole after serving ten years.269  As part of Shawn X.’s parole conditions, 
he was not permitted to have any contact with individuals under eighteen 
years old without written permission from his parole officer.270  
Nonetheless, Shawn X. repeatedly came into contact with a three-year-old 
boy, and his parole was eventually revoked.271 
After Shawn X.’s parole was revoked, the state brought a petition against 
Shawn X., arguing Shawn X. was a detained sex offender requiring civil 
management.272  At Shawn X.’s trial, the respondent argued that his contact 
with the three-year-old boy was inadmissible hearsay evidence as the family 
of the three-year-old boy never brought charges against him.273  The court, 
however, disagreed and established the “unduly prejudicial” test to 
determine whether certain types of hearsay evidence are admissible.274 
After Shawn X., the question of whether the professional reliability 
exception applies requires an analysis of the “unduly prejudicial” test.275  
First, the court must ask whether experts in the relevant field traditionally 
rely upon the type of evidence in question.276  Second, the court must ask 
whether such evidence is more prejudicial than probative.277  In 2013, the 
court carefully analyzed this two-fold test in a decision that would 
significantly impact the types of evidence permissible at Article § 10 
proceedings.278 
4.  The Court’s Holding:  State v. Floyd Y. 
Although the Floyd Y. decision came down in 2013, the facts of the case 
date back approximately twenty years.279  In January 2001, Floyd Y. was 
convicted of four counts of first-degree sexual abuse and four counts of 
endangering the welfare of a child for abusing his two stepchildren.280  
Almost five years later, when Floyd Y. was nearing release from prison, the 
Department of Correctional Services “invoked Mental Hygiene Law § 9.27 
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and transferred Floyd Y. to Kirby Psychiatric Center.”281  At the time, 
Article § 9 was used to civilly commit dangerous sex offenders because 
Article § 10 had not yet been enacted.282 
On April 13, 2007—a year and four months after the Department of 
Correctional Services transferred Floyd Y. to Kirby—Article § 10 was 
enacted, and the state petitioned to have Floyd Y. civilly committed.283  At 
trial, the State’s expert witness, Dr. Mortiere, explained that she believed 
Floyd Y. suffered from pedophilia, antisocial personality disorder, and 
polysubstance dependence and that the combination of these mental 
illnesses made it likely Floyd Y. would reoffend.284  In addition to 
interviewing Floyd Y., Dr. Mortiere based her opinion on victim affidavits, 
police reports, court records, and other psychiatric professionals’ 
evaluations.285  Dr. Mortiere discussed Floyd Y.’s sexual abuse of his two 
stepchildren, for which he was convicted, as well as seven other similar 
crimes.286 
Dr. Mortiere explained that, in total, Floyd Y. had sexually abused nine 
individuals.287  In 1992, Floyd Y. was convicted of sexual assault for 
abusing his first victim, a twenty-three-year-old woman.288  In 1994, Floyd 
Y. was accused of sexually abusing a teenage girl289 and, in 1995, pled 
guilty to harassing the girl’s twin sister.290  In 1996, Floyd Y. was accused, 
yet acquitted, of abusing an eight-year-old family friend291 and, during that 
same year, admitted to having inappropriate telephone conversations with 
his seventeen-year-old sister-in-law.292  In 1998, Floyd Y. was accused but 
never charged with abusing his then-girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter, 
and charges were brought, but eventually dropped, for abusing the same 
woman’s fifteen-year-old daughter.293  Finally, in 2001, Floyd Y. was 
convicted of abusing his two stepchildren.294  Dr. Mortiere’s testimony 
about Floyd Y.’s criminal history was made without any personal 
knowledge of these events, which eventually led to Floyd Y.’s appeal.295 
The New York State Court of Appeals analyzed Floyd Y.’s appeal by 
applying the two-part test for the admissibility of hearsay evidence under 
the professional reliability exception.296  All of the evidence passed the first 
part of the test because it was the type of evidence traditionally relied on by 
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experts in the field.297  As to the second part of the test, the court concluded 
that out of nine alleged sexual abuse victims, hearsay evidence regarding 
four victims was admissible.298  The court reasoned that the hearsay 
evidence was reliable because it was accompanied by adjudications of guilt, 
and the hearsay evidence was therefore more probative than prejudicial.299 
Hearsay evidence regarding Floyd Y.’s inappropriate telephone calls with 
his seventeen-year-old sister-in-law was also admissible because the 
respondent admitted to the abuse.300  The court held that a respondent’s 
admission is indicative of reliability and is therefore also more probative 
than prejudicial.301 
Hearsay evidence regarding Floyd Y.’s fifteen-year-old victim, the 
daughter of his ex-girlfriend, was found to be admissible because Floyd Y. 
signed a parole agreement to stay away from her.302  The court clarified its 
decision by noting that, although the signed parole agreement was enough 
to deem it more probative than prejudicial, it did not “conclusively prove 
the allegations” against Floyd Y.303 
The hearsay evidence regarding the three remaining allegations, however, 
was not admissible in court.304  The court held that, unlike convictions or 
admissions, acquittals and uncharged crimes are “more prejudicial than 
probative.”305  Thus, the 1994 accusation against Floyd Y. of abusing a 
teenage girl, the 1996 accusation of abusing an eight-year-old girl, and the 
1998 accusation of abusing his ex-girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter were 
inadmissible hearsay evidence.306  The court did opine, however, that, if the 
State could substantiate these allegations with extrinsic evidence, they 
might be found reliable and thus more probative than prejudicial.307 
In determining which types of extrinsic evidence would substantiate such 
hearsay evidence, the court suggested that the State require live 
confrontation of the victims to determine the victims’ reliability.308  
Although the Floyd Y. court recognized that Article § 10 proceedings are 
civil in nature and therefore the respondent is not guaranteed the right to 
confront his accusers,309 the court concluded that the Due Process Clauses 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments supported its suggestion.310  The 
court reasoned that, because Floyd Y.’s liberty interest, protected by the 
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Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, is in direct conflict with the possibility 
of being civilly committed, hearsay evidence must meet a minimum 
threshold of reliability.311 
In addition, the Floyd Y. court cited to the Mathews v. Eldridge312 
balancing test, which weighs “(1) the private interest of the litigant; (2) the 
risk of erroneous deprivation in the absence of substitute procedures; and 
(3) the State’s interest in avoiding additional procedures.”313  It is from this 
test that the court concluded that the most reliable way to substantiate 
hearsay evidence regarding “[c]riminal charges that resulted in neither 
acquittal nor conviction” is to “require live confrontation of the declarant to 
ensure the statement’s reliability.”314 
B.  The Floyd Y. Decision and the Requirements of the Law 
Part II.B first examines whether the Constitution requires live 
confrontation in Article § 10 proceedings.  This section then explores 
whether New York State’s Civil Practice Law and Rules require live 
confrontation in Article § 10 proceedings.  Finally, it explores whether the 
legislative intent of Article § 10 supports a live confrontation requirement. 
1.  The Confrontation Clause and Article § 10 Proceedings 
As defined in Part I.B.1 of this Note, the Confrontation Clause requires 
that individuals accused of criminal offenses be able to question and cross 
examine their accusers in open court.315  The Confrontation Clause, 
however, is not applicable in civil proceedings.316  Therefore, the 
Confrontation Clause plays no role in Article § 10 proceedings as Article 
§ 10 cases are civil, not criminal.317  Even if Article § 10 cases were 
criminal, however, both recent statutes and court cases suggest that live 
confrontation still would not be required.318 
As discussed in Part I.B.1 of this Note, the Supreme Court ruled in 
Maryland v. Craig that in cases involving child victims, the accused’s right 
to confrontation is not absolute.319  State legislatures have been relatively 
silent when it comes to whether the accused’s right to confrontation is 
absolute in cases involving adult victims of sexual assault, with the 
exception of Hawaii.320  In Hawaii, a broad statute offers victims and 
witnesses “the right to testify at trial by televised two-way CCTV to be 
viewed by the court, the accused, and the trier of fact.”321  The justification 
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for this statute is that it promotes cooperation between victims and law 
enforcement and “ensure[s] that all victims and witnesses of crimes are 
treated with [the] dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity” that they 
deserve.322  Whether such alternatives will be available to an adult victim is 
decided on a case-by-case basis.323 
Although state and federal courts have also been relatively silent on the 
issue of whether Craig can be extended to adult victims, some courts have 
formed an opinion.324  For example, in People v. Wrotten,325 the New York 
State Court of Appeals held that “[n]owhere does Craig suggest that it is 
limited to child witnesses.”326  In a federal case heard by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court held that Craig “suggest[s] a general 
rule not limited to protecting child victims.”327  In fact, it is possible to read 
Craig “as allowing a necessity-based exception for face-to-face, in-
courtroom confrontation where the witness’s inability to testify invokes the 
state’s interest in protecting the witness—from trauma in child sexual abuse 
cases or, as here, from physical danger or suffering” from the defendant.328 
Although courts’ willingness to address the breadth of Craig is sparse, 
the Fifth Circuit and the New York State Court of Appeals suggest Craig 
should not be limited to cases involving child victims of sexual abuse.329  
Therefore, even if Article § 10 proceedings were subject to the 
Confrontation Clause, it is possible that live confrontation still would not be 
required. 
2.  New York State’s Civil Practice Law and Rules:  
The General Rule Against Hearsay 
Whereas the Confrontation Clause applies only to criminal cases, Article 
§ 45 of the New York State Civil Practice Law and Rules applies to all New 
York State civil proceedings.330  Therefore, in all civil cases, hearsay 
evidence is inadmissible unless it falls within one of New York State’s 
hearsay exceptions.331  As held in Floyd Y., hearsay evidence regarding 
uncharged crimes and/or dropped charges, even if it meets the first part of 
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the professional reliability exception, is still inadmissible under the second 
part of the professional reliability exception if it is more prejudicial than 
probative.332 
The Floyd Y. court suggested that, in order to establish the reliability of 
hearsay evidence pertaining to uncharged and acquitted crimes, courts 
should require live confrontation of the declarant to ensure the statements’ 
reliability.333  In no jurisdiction in the United States, however, is live 
confrontation required in civil cases.334  Nonetheless, introducing such 
hearsay that is more prejudicial than probative would violate due process 
and thus require substantiation.335 
As described in Part I.A.2 of this Note, twenty states and the federal 
government have statutes pertaining to the civil commitment of dangerous 
sex offenders.336  Most of these states not only have similar sex offender 
civil commitment statutes337 but also have substantially similar rules 
against hearsay.338  Further, many of these states also have similar 
professional reliability exceptions,339 and all of these states are required to 
abide by the due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution.340 
In Massachusetts, however, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that a 
respondent suffered no prejudice when hearsay evidence regarding an 
uncharged crime was introduced as evidence because the jury was presented 
with such strong evidence pertaining to the respondent’s dangerousness.341  
The jury was presented with the respondent’s adult and juvenile records, 
which indicated that the respondent had been found guilty of two counts of 
rape of a child, two counts of aggravated rape of a child, and five counts of 
assault and battery of a child under fourteen years old.342  Therefore, in 
cases where there is sufficient nonhearsay evidence and/or sufficiently 
reliable hearsay evidence, there is no due process violation in introducing 
hearsay evidence pertaining to uncharged crimes.343 
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In In re Detention of Isbell,344 the Appellate Court of Illinois held that the 
respondent suffered no prejudice when the trial court permitted an expert 
witness to rely on hearsay testimony about an allegation of sexual assault a 
janitor made against the respondent.345  The court held that, as long as the 
expert testified that the information was used for the sole purpose of 
forming his or her opinion and not for the truth of the underlying facts, the 
evidence presented was more probative than prejudicial.346 
Similarly, in In re Commitment of Tesson,347 the Texas Court of Appeals 
permitted experts to testify about various alleged uncharged crimes against 
the respondent.348  The court held that, so long as the jury was instructed 
that the experts used the underlying evidence only to form their opinions 
and that it was up to the jury to determine the credibility of the underlying 
facts, there was no due process violation.349 
The Floyd Y. court explicitly acknowledged in its decision that, in civil 
cases, substantiating hearsay evidence can be accomplished in a variety of 
ways.350  However, the court’s holding suggesting live confrontation failed 
to acknowledge any other alternative.351  As evidenced by Massachusetts, 
Illinois, and Texas, however, there are ways in which to introduce hearsay 
evidence regarding uncharged crimes and/or dropped charges without 
violating due process and also without unnecessarily involving the 
testimony of past victims of sexual assault.352 
3.  Article § 10’s Legislative Intent 
Floyd Y. was a novel case.  The court suggested a way to substantiate 
hearsay evidence deemed more prejudicial than probative:  live 
confrontation.353  The laws governing civil commitment cases do not 
require live confrontation.354  There is also evidence in Article § 10’s 
legislative history that the legislature did not intend for victims to play a 
role in such proceedings.355 
For example, in the bill to enact Article § 10, the Senate proposed to 
amend Criminal Procedure Law §§ 380.50(4) and (5), which set forth the 
notification system available to victims of sexual assault.356  By amending 
Criminal Procedure Law §§ 380.50(4) and (5), the state would be required, 
if requested, to notify victims of sexual offenses, as defined under Article 
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§ 10.03(p), of a change in their abusers’ statuses.357  Such changes in status 
include if/when an abuser escapes, absconds, or is released from custody.358  
Further, the amendment also requires the state to notify victims of sexual 
assault if/when their abusers are transferred to the custody of the Office of 
Mental Health or are released from civil confinement.359 
The purpose of amending this section of the Criminal Procedure Law is 
to ensure that a victim is notified if there is a change in his or her abuser’s 
status.360  This information might help victims implement any precautions 
they feel are necessary if their abusers are released and, at minimum, inform 
victims that their abusers may be out in public.361 
The tendency of convicted sex offenders to secure early release dates 
and/or short sentences is addressed in a letter to Governor Spitzer regarding 
Article § 10.362  The New York State Psychiatric Association (NYSPA) 
explains that individuals accused of sexual assault are often able to secure 
short prison sentences by pleabargaining.363  The District Attorney’s Office 
often engages in pleabargaining “to avoid the need for their victims, often 
children, to testify in court regarding the crimes committed against 
them.”364  This is the first piece of evidence in the legislative history of 
Article § 10 that addresses how live confrontation affects sexual assault 
victims.365  The New York City Bar expands on this piece of evidence, 
explaining that Article § 10 is a response “to the public’s feeling that sex 
offenses are so damaging to victims, and so frightening to potential victims, 
that offenders should be sternly punished and closely watched for many 
years.”366 
Both the NYSPA and the New York City Bar suggest that victims of 
sexual assault are not only damaged by the crimes committed against them 
but might be further damaged if forced to testify in open court.367  Article 
§ 10 supports this sentiment, in that psychiatric examiners are not permitted 
to gain access to any identifying information of a victim without a court 
order or good cause368 to ensure a victim’s privacy.369  Further, Article § 10 
also ensures that a respondent will not be capable of contacting one of his 
victims.370 
In addition to live confrontation not being required by the laws governing 
civil commitment statutes and being against the legislative intent of Article 
§ 10, live confrontation is also arguably against public policy.  The 
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following part will explore the psychological impacts, both positive and 
negative, that live confrontation has on victims of sexual assault. 
III.  THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF LIVE CONFRONTATION  
ON VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 
Part III begins by presenting the argument that victims may benefit by 
confronting their abusers.  It then presents the argument that live 
confrontation is detrimental to victims of sexual assault. 
A.  Live Confrontation Is Psychologically Beneficial  
for Victims of Sexual Assault 
The court in Floyd Y. suggested that a reliable way to substantiate 
hearsay evidence regarding acquittals and/or dropped charges is to “require 
live confrontation of the declarant to ensure the statement’s reliability.”371  
Although the Floyd Y. court did not address any arguments about the effects 
of live confrontation on sexual assault victims, there are psychological 
studies that suggest that, in a limited number of situations, live 
confrontation may not be as harmful as expected.372 
For example, in an article about the effects of disclosure and intervention 
on sexually abused children, Dr. Berliner and Dr. Conte explain that live 
confrontation does not always lead to more symptoms in victims of sexual 
assault.373  In a study conducted on children who testified in juvenile court, 
those children who testified actually showed more improvement than those 
who did not.374  Only those children who had to testify more than once or 
those children who were subject to long and harsh cross examination were 
less likely to show improvement.375  Thus, Dr. Berliner and Dr. Conte 
concluded that, in cases where a child is only required to testify once under 
relatively moderate conditions, testifying in open court may not lead to 
more symptoms in child victims of sexual assault.376 
Dr. Berliner and Dr. Conte describe their conclusions of a case study of 
two groups of child victims of sexual assault:  one group who did testify in 
criminal court and one group who did not.377  Many children who testified 
felt that it was not as bad as they thought it would be.378  Further, some of 
the children who did not testify regretted their decisions.379 
Dr. Berliner and Dr. Conte’s findings are supported by an earlier study 
conducted by Dr. Runyan, who concluded that, in cases which terminated 
quickly in either a conviction or plea bargain, children who testified 
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recovered just as fast as children who did not.380  In fact, Dr. Runyan claims 
that, in such cases, children who testified recovered even faster than those 
who did not testify.381 
In both case studies, children who testified under moderate conditions, in 
cases that were resolved relatively quickly with either a conviction or a plea 
bargain, recovered just as fast as or even faster than those children who did 
not testify.382  In more complicated cases, however, both studies concluded 
that the psychological impact on child victims of sexual assault was very 
different.383 
B.  Live Confrontation Is Psychologically Detrimental  
for Victims of Sexual Assault 
The Floyd Y. court’s suggestion to use live confrontation to substantiate 
hearsay evidence was novel in Article § 10 cases; however, live 
confrontation has been—and still is—used to substantiate hearsay evidence 
in criminal proceedings.384  Live confrontation is often present during a 
criminal proceeding because the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused 
the right to confront their accusers.385  Consequently, numerous psychiatric 
professionals have published articles on the psychological effects of live 
confrontation on victims of crimes.386 
Psychiatric professionals have predominantly focused on the impact of 
live confrontation on sexually abused children.387  This is particularly 
relevant in Article § 10 cases.  As the legislative history of Article § 10 
explains, “those referred for civil commitment should be repeat, chronic 
felony sex offenders who have committed predatory crimes involving 
violence, stranger victims or young children.”388 
The majority of studies regarding the psychological effects of live 
confrontation on sexually abused children conclude that, overall, testifying 
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does more harm than good for victims of sexual assault.389  Not only can 
testifying be stressful in court, it can also lead to numerous emotional 
consequences.390  For example, children may be re exposed to feelings of 
betrayal, helplessness, and powerlessness, and confronting their abusers 
may bring the memories of abuse to the forefront of their minds.391 
Another consequence of live confrontation is that the emotional impact 
of testifying in court may stay with the child into adulthood.392  Studies 
suggest that a child might develop at a slower rate “than his or her peers 
because trauma during childhood can delay normal cognitive and emotional 
development.”393  Testifying before one’s abuser can also lead to 
“depression, anxiety, and some psychosomatic symptoms.”394 
In addition to causing problems into adulthood, testifying in court may 
also lead to immediate negative results.395  In a controlled study regarding 
the emotional effects on child sexual assault victims, numerous psychiatric 
professionals concluded that children who testified in open court 
experienced more symptoms than children who did not, especially those 
children who had to testify more than once.396 
Although a substantial number of articles focus on the impact live 
confrontation has on child victims, there are also articles addressing adult 
victims.397  In her published article, Dr. Moriarty explains that, by requiring 
a victim to retell his or her experience, a victim is forced to relive the 
abuse.398  Reliving experiences of abuse can be extremely painful, and 
“much of the criminal justice literature supports this position.”399  Dr. 
Moriarty concludes that, by retelling their stories of abuse, victims in 
general may suffer irreparable emotional harm.400 
Dr. Moriarty’s conclusions are further supported by a study that tracked 
fear reactions in rape victims for one year after the assaults.401  Dr. 
Calhoun’s study aimed to determine what types of situations evoked fear in 
rape victims and to what degree such fear was evoked.402  After further 
investigation about how live confrontation affected rape victims, the study 
concluded that victims who were required to testify in open court felt it was 
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“highly traumatic” not only because they were forced to relive their abuse 
but also because their credibility and integrity were questioned and 
attacked.403  Because live confrontation has the potential to evoke 
debilitating fear in rape victims, the study suggests that, if a victim is forced 
to testify, he or she will require extensive support from psychiatric 
professionals.404 
One final article regarding the impact of judicial involvement, 
specifically the impact of live confrontation on victims of sexual assault, 
sums up psychiatric professionals’ fears by drawing distinctions between 
what a victim needs and what the court requires: 
Victims need social acknowledgment and support; the court requires them 
to endure a public challenge to their credibility.  Victims need to establish 
a sense of power and control over their lives; the court requires them to 
submit to a complex set of rules and procedures that they may not 
understand, and over which they have no control.  Victims need an 
opportunity to tell their stories in their own way, in a setting of their 
choice; the court requires them to respond to a set of yes-or-no questions 
that break down any personal attempt to construct a coherent and 
meaningful narrative.  Victims often need to control or limit their 
exposure to specific reminders of the trauma; the court requires them to 
relive the experience by directly confronting the perpetrator.405 
By drawing distinctions between what courts offer to victims and the 
psychological needs of victims, Dr. Herman attempts to show that judicial 
involvement may be harmful for victims of sex crimes, further supporting 
the notion that live confrontation should not be required at civil 
commitment proceedings.406 
IV.  FINDING A BALANCE BETWEEN THE GENERAL WELFARE  
OF VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AND DUE PROCESS OF THE LAW 
Part IV concludes that live confrontation can be, and should be, the last 
resort to substantiate hearsay evidence in the Article § 10 setting.  This part 
first explains that by applying already established hearsay exceptions in 
New York State, live confrontation is unnecessary in Article § 10 cases.  It 
then suggests that, if New York State continues to require live 
confrontation, it should implement video technology to reduce the 
psychological impact of live confrontation on victims of sexual assault.  
Finally, it concludes with suggesting various reforms in the criminal justice 
system that have the ability to drastically reduce and eventually eliminate 
the need for live confrontation in Article § 10 proceedings. 
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A.  New York State’s Hearsay Exceptions 
In suggesting live confrontation as the way to substantiate hearsay 
evidence pertaining to uncharged crimes and/or dropped charges, the New 
York State Court of Appeals failed to address alternatives that do not 
require the presence of victims of sexual assault.407  The Floyd Y. court 
opined that due process required live confrontation to establish the 
statements’ reliability; however, states such as Massachusetts, Illinois, and 
Texas, which all have substantially similar hearsay rules and exceptions, 
have, in similar cases, ensured due process without victim involvement.408 
New York State should consider revising its present holding by 
incorporating the holdings of one or more of these other states.409  In cases 
where there is sufficient nonhearsay evidence and/or sufficient reliable 
hearsay evidence, New York State could permit hearsay evidence regarding 
uncharged and/or dropped crimes in Article § 10 proceedings as it is not a 
violation of due process to introduce such statements when a prima facie 
case has already been established.410  This would have been especially 
significant in State v. Floyd Y., as the court had already introduced 
admissible evidence pertaining to seven of Floyd Y.’s past crimes.411 
As an alternative, New York State should consider whether an expert’s 
testimony or a jury instruction that hearsay is being used for the sole 
purpose of forming an expert opinion and not for the truth of the underlying 
facts ensures due process.412  If these alternatives have been held to satisfy 
the requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in other states, 
there is no reason why they would not ensure due process in New York.413 
If New York refuses to adopt such holdings, courts should investigate 
whether hearsay statements regarding uncharged crimes and/or dropped 
charges fall within one of New York State’s hearsay exceptions before 
requiring live confrontation.414  For example, the court should look to see if 
any statements fall under the exception for excited utterances.415  As most 
Article § 10 cases involve sexual assault, rape, and/or child abuse, there is 
the possibility that a victim told someone about the abuse.416  If the court is 
still concerned with the statements’ reliability, they should require the 
outcry witness,417 not the victim, to come in and testify in order to ensure 
the statements’ reliability. 
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Similarly, because most Article § 10 cases involve sexual assault, rape, 
and/or child abuse, there is the possibility that a victim sought professional 
help.418  In such cases, statements regarding uncharged crimes and/or 
dropped charges discussed during treatment should be admitted under the 
hearsay exception for statements made for medical treatment or 
diagnosis.419  If the court wishes to evaluate the statements’ reliability, they 
have the option of subpoenaing the treating physician and sparing a victim 
of sexual assault the hardship of testifying in open court.420 
Lastly, the court should consider interpreting the hearsay exception for 
when a party causes the declarant’s unavailability more broadly in the 
Article § 10 setting.421  Various criminal courts have held that, when a 
victim feels pressure not to testify in front of his or her abuser, hearsay 
evidence may be admitted under this exception.422  For example, in People 
v. Byrd, the court held that a victim’s out-of-court statements were 
permissible under the hearsay exception for when a party causes the 
declarant’s unavailability because the victim suffered from battered person 
syndrome resulting from years of physical and emotional abuse.423  Further, 
in People v. Jernigan, the court held that a victim’s out-of-court statements 
were permissible under the same exception because the victim would feel 
pressure not to testify as a result of being in a prior abusive relationship.424 
It can be plausibly argued that a victim of sexual assault would feel 
tremendous pressure not to testify in front of his or her abuser.425  Because 
most civil commitment proceedings take place decades after the abuse, 
requiring a victim to testify may bring back memories that the victim has 
done his or her best to put out of his or her mind.426  Such revictimization 
may be too much to bear for a victim of sexual assault and can easily be 
attributed to the abuser’s actions.427 
B.  Implementation of Video Technology 
If New York State continues to require live confrontation to substantiate 
hearsay evidence regarding uncharged crimes and/or dropped charges, the 
court should consider utilizing video technology to reduce the detrimental 
effects of live confrontation on victims of sexual assault.428  As held 
constitutional by Maryland v. Craig, courts are permitted to implement 
alternative procedures if the state can adequately show that such procedures 
would protect a child from the trauma of testifying in open court.429  There 
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is no reason why the same rule should not apply to sex offender civil 
commitment proceedings, regardless of the victim’s age.430 
Article § 10 proceedings are unique in that they often occur decades after 
crimes take place and target repeat, chronic sex offenders who prey on child 
victims.431  Therefore, although many victims were children at the time of 
the abuse, they are grown by the time civil commitment proceedings begin 
and are therefore not afforded the “special procedure[s]” upheld by 
Craig.432 
By expanding Craig’s holding to sex offender civil commitment 
proceedings, the court would spare victims of sexual assault unnecessary 
trauma from testifying in court.433  As explained in Part III.B of this Note, 
testifying in court can force a victim to relive the abuse by recalling horrific 
details of rape and/or sexual assault.434  Testifying in court may also lead to 
irreparable harm such as depression, anxiety, and uncontrollable fear.435 
There is nothing in the Craig decision that implies it should be limited to 
children.436  Further, as Article § 10 decisions are civil, not criminal, there 
is no constitutional argument that a respondent in a civil commitment 
proceeding has the right to confront his accuser.437  The only evidentiary 
concern in an Article § 10 proceeding would be the admissibility of 
unreliable hearsay evidence, which, through one-way CCTV, two-way 
CCTV, or videotaped depositions, could be evaluated by the court. 
C.  Changes in the Criminal Justice System 
Finding a way to introduce hearsay evidence through an exception to the 
hearsay rule, or permitting victims to testify through video technology are 
two alternatives aimed to reduce the need for live confrontation in civil 
commitment proceedings.  There are reforms, however, within the criminal 
justice system, which may one day eliminate the need for live confrontation 
in civil commitment hearings. 
One option the legislature should consider is reforming sentencing 
guidelines for violent sex offenders.  Instead of presenting evidence that a 
sex offender suffers from a mental abnormality at a civil commitment 
hearing, such evidence could be presented at the criminal trial.  Evidence 
pertaining to mental abnormality and dangerousness could then be 
considered at the sentencing phase of the trial, thus eliminating the need for 
civil commitment proceedings entirely. 
The most important change that could—and should—be implemented in 
the criminal justice system pertains to the documentation of accusations of 
sexual assault.  It is vital that the District Attorney’s Office takes all 
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accusations of sexual assault seriously, documenting all testimony and 
evidence in thorough detail.  Even if the District Attorney does not believe 
that a case can move forward because of a lack of corroborating evidence, 
he or she still should take whatever steps necessary to document the 
declarant’s accusations. 
The District Attorney may choose to depose the declarant on video, so 
that if the accused is one day petitioned for civil commitment, such video 
testimony can be admitted at trial.  The same course of action could be 
implemented in a case where charges are brought but the accused is 
acquitted.  Although implementing these measures may seem unnecessary 
at the time, the small effort and cost it would require is well worth the 
spared suffering down the road. 
CONCLUSION 
In New York State civil commitment hearings, hearsay evidence 
regarding uncharged crimes and/or dropped charges is inadmissible in 
court.  In State v. Floyd Y., the New York State Court of Appeals held that 
hearsay evidence regarding uncharged crimes and/or dropped charges could 
be found to be reliable if the declarant testifies in open court.  The court’s 
suggestion to require live confrontation in these cases subjects victims of 
sexual assault to unnecessary, irreparable harm.  The court may implement 
various alternatives, such as utilizing the widely recognized exceptions to 
the general rule against hearsay, utilizing video technology, and promoting 
significant changes in the criminal justice system, to reduce and eventually 
eliminate the need for live confrontation.  Each of these alternatives would 
satisfy due process while sparing victims of violent sexual assaults the 
trauma of testifying in open court. 
 
